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Abstract 
The two driving questions are: What may be fruitful ways to modify existing research mores and theoretical 
assumptions in cognitive studies? How do we integrate the cognitive sciences with the normative? These result 
respectively in an overture to expand the cognitive canon, and uniquely derive the normative weight to excel from work 
in the mind sciences and skillful coping connected to standards inherent to and resulting from the active pursuits central 
to this examination: sports, performing and martial arts, and crafts. Animate bodies best show the connection between 
the normative and the cognitive, and how these correlate with bodies, their kinetic capabilities, and the context of a 
community. This leads to a reconsideration of how cognitive studies—to include neuroscience, cognitive science, and 
philosophy—go about their business. The “cognitive canon” is thus extended and modified on a number of fronts 
regarding methodology, subject matter, and focus. Specifically, I suggest the need to go beyond conventional research 
foci embraced by both mainstream cognitivist and alternative embodied cognition approaches: the argument is to go 
beyond vision, normality and the pathological to explicitly incorporate the kinetic-tactile and the exceptional under a 
framework that re-conceptualizes matters across the board. 
Keywords:  cognition, kinesthesia, movement, phenomenology
Resumen
Las dos preguntas rectoras son: ¿Cuáles pueden ser las formas fructíferas de modificar los hábitos de 
investigación y las suposiciones teóricas en los estudios cognitivos? ¿Cómo  integramos las ciencias cognitivas con las 
normativas? Éstas conducen respectivamente a la propuesta de la expansión del canon de lo cognitivo, y 
particularmente a alcanzar la fuerza normativa para tener éxito en las ciencias de la mente y para lidiar de forma 
adecuada con los criterios propios y resultantes de las actividades que son centrales en este análisis: el deporte, la 
práctica de artes marciales, y las actividades artesanales. Los cuerpos en movimiento muestran mejor la conexión entre 
lo normativo y lo cognitivo, y cómo estos se relacionan con los cuerpos, su capacidades cinéticas y el contexto de una 
comunidad. Esto lleva a una reconsideración de cómo los estudios cognitivos— neurociencia, ciencia cognitiva, y 
filosofía—realizan su cometido. El “canon de lo cognitivo” es así extendido y modificado en diversos frentes 
relacionados con la metodología, el contenido, y el enfoque.  Concretamente, defiendo la necesidad de ir más allá del 
enfoque de investigación convencional adoptado tanto por la corriente cognitivista principal, como por las propuestas 
alternativas de cognitivismo corpóreo: el argumento consiste en ir más allá de la visión, la normalidad y lo patológico 
para incorporar de forma explícita lo cinético-táctil y lo excepcional en un sistema que re-conceptualice las cuestiones 
en todos los niveles.
Términos Clave: cognición, kinesteia, movimiento, fenomenología 
In the Zhuangzi we find a story where Confucius is contemplating an imposing waterfall at the 
gorge of Lü-liang, so powerful that no fish or animal could swim in its waters. He then sees an old 
man swimming in the thick of it, and thinks he must be trying to end his unhappy life. Confucius 
sends his disciples to the rescue only to find the man, hair disheveled, happily humming and 
walking about. Confounded, Confucius, on realizing it was not a spirit  but a man, asks him how he 
could stay  afloat like that. The old man replies, “no particular way. I began (to learn the art) at the 
very earliest time; as I grew up, it became my nature to practise it; and my success in it is now as 
sure as fate. I enter and go down with the water in the very centre of its whirl, and come up again 
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with it when it whirls the other way. I follow the way of the water, and do nothing contrary to it of 
myself; – this is how I tread it.” Confucius, confused, asks what this really  meant, and the 
explanation is that the old man was “born among these hills and lived contented among them; – that 
was why I say  that I have trod this water from my earliest time. I grew up by it, and have been 
happy treading it; – that is why I said that to tread it  had become natural to me. I know not how I do 
it, and yet I do it; – that is why I say that my success is as sure as fate.’ ”1
 This tale illustrates how certain excellences that result in exceptional performances derive 
from practice in attunement with our abilities and the environment. Moreover, such abilities are 
genuine cognitively intelligent ways of successfully navigating our world. Further, it  hints that there 
are certain standards of performance that require adaptation to and observance thereof. Said 
standards are normative: they specify  what superior performance is about. While in the story natural 
conditions set these, in other endeavors these issue from communities. These points echo themes 
that underlie the following discussion.
Starting with the notion of activities for which performance, movement, and the pursuit of 
excellence are central,2  the two driving questions are: 1) what may be fruitful ways to modify 
existing research mores and theoretical assumptions in cognitive studies? In this regard, this study  is 
an overture to expand the cognitive canon. And, 2) how do we integrate the cognitive sciences with 
the normative? Uniquely, the normative weight to excel is derived not only from conceptual 
requirements from the ethical sphere, but also from work in the mind sciences and skillful coping 
that is connected to standards inherent to and resulting from the active pursuits central to this 
examination—sports, performing and martial arts, and crafts. Animate bodies, in particular as 
incorporated into active pursuits, best show the connection between the normative and the 
cognitive, and how these correlate with bodies, their kinetic capabilities, and the context of a 
community. This addresses the following issue: How do our understanding of mind, body and 
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1  Adapted from James Legge’s Translation of the Zhuangzi. http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/full-understanding-of-life 
Accessed 2/20/2013. Given the terseness, concreteness, and metaphorically rich nature of Chinese, translations are a 
complex affair—particularly of Chinese classics. For alternative translations of this passage see also: Zhuangzi,  and B. 
Watson, 204-205; Höchsmann, Guorong, and Zhuangzi, 200-201; Zhuangzi, and Graham, 136.  Zhuangzi and Ziporyn, 
81.  Jean François Billeter interprets this and other similar passages in light of what he terms “régimes de l’activité,” a 
sort of cultivated ways of acting in consonance with the circumstances, see 28-40.
2 This piece is connected to a larger project, a monograph, Skillful Striving: reflective cultivation of excellence, active 
pursuits, and kinesthetic cognition, to be published as a special issue in the journal Sport, Ethics and Philosophy in 
2014.  The monograph explores the cultivation of excellence (understood as deliberate dedication to develop our 
abilities), the conditions that render this possible, and its potential to inspire. It involves an East-West comparative, 
interdisciplinary approach to active pursuits within the framework of corporeal kinetic cognition,  i.e., intelligence 
originating in movement, touch, and embodiment. The underlying premise: we flourish best through a deliberative and 
intuitive understanding that combines intellectual, physical, and emotional abilities through disciplined movement, 
purposeful reflection, and emotive control.
cognition connect with the social and moral spheres of our lives? In certain practices, i.e., active 
pursuits, the connection is integral to said practices, as I contend below.
Pondering on the above leads to a reconsideration of how cognitive studies—to include 
neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy—go about their business.  To this end, I argue for 
an extension and modification of the “cognitive canon” on a number of fronts regarding 
methodology, subject matter, and focus. Specifically, I suggest the need to go beyond conventional 
research foci embraced by both mainstream cognitivist and alternative embodied cognition 
approaches. Rather that mere antagonism this posits that in spite of the wealth of insight these 
approaches provide they remain limited perspectives on their own best  supplemented by a broader 
horizon of relevant phenomena. To effect this, I propose to expand the current research in congruent 
ways to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi’s proposal in The Phenomenological Mind, where they 
write, “If real progress is to be made in the study of the mind, it requires a collaborative effort that 
draws on all the available resources and that integrates a variety of theoretical and empirical 
disciplines and methods.”(2008: 221. My emphasis) My goal is to make a case for active pursuits, 
highly  demanding in an intelligently kinetic and tactile fashion, to legitimize them as activities 
themselves, objects of study, and cognitive modes. In particular, I wish to go beyond vision, 
normality  and the pathological to also incorporate much more explicitly the kinetic-tactile and the 
exceptional under a framework that re-conceptualizes matters. There are four sections to this paper. 
The first one considers how to expand the cognitive canon; the second looks at the connection 
between the normative and the cognitive, which also entails an extension of methodological and 
disciplinary  practices; the third sketches consequences of this program and possible future research 
venues; and a succinct conclusion summarizes key points and highlights benefits of this program. 
1. Expanding the Cognitive Canon
The pursuit of excellence is apportioned among myriad practices of varyingly correlated 
intellectual or physical, theoretical or practical, rational or emotional, and passive or active variants. 
Mainstream views on cognition favor the antecedents in the previous disjunctions, valuing 
theoretical knowledge over practical know-how. Classical cognitivism, which propounds an 
information processing model, likens the mind to a computer, stresses representation, explicit 
awareness, rule following, and is firmly anchored in theoria. In a related manner, Western 
philosophy in general has long mistrusted the body and activities closely tied to it. Arguably, this 
can be traced to Plato’s prejudice against the body, and is vindicated by Descartes’ epistemological 
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mistrust of bodies and material substances and preference for the mind and thinking.3 The outcome 
is that not only are intellect and its higher cognitive functions given priority  when it comes to 
investigating cognitive processes, but more controversially, this supports a model of cognition that 
favors the cerebral cortex and relegates all else to the “dark dungeons” of pre-human physiology 
and evolution. This is problematic because it is too partial to adequately explain the phenomena it 
deals with.
A more inclusive view of what counts as cognition is in order. Robert P. Crease’s points out that 
of the two ways we have of knowing the world, one theoretical and linguistic, endorsed by science, 
and the other experiential, subjective and practical, we feel as if we must prioritize and favor the 
former. After convincingly  arguing that athletes do not ‘know’ the laws of physics but rather know 
the laws of ‘physics,’ Crease concludes that, “Conflating the senses of knowing – and giving 
priority to the theoretical sense over the practical – simply reflects our adherence to the ancient 
myth that true knowledge is theoretical.” (2012a: 19) Indeed, both are complementary and serve our 
varied needs and interests. As a matter of fact, most of our every  day lives’ interactions take place in 
the realm of the practical as Edmund Husserl points out (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008:136). The 
point is that, for different reasons, both are legitimate ways of learning about and engaging the 
world. Of course, our conceptual cogitations are theoretical. But, this does not imply  that they 
suffice to explain much less are enough to interact with the world in the most  beneficial way for any 
given situation. Neither does this mean that we should limit learning, intelligence, and thinking to 
abstraction, rationality, and the cortex.
Aligned with and building on a modified cognitively embodied approach I contend that active 
pursuits, being grounded in movement, 1) cultivate our capability  to learn and excel kinetically and 
kinesthetically, and 2) are not merely advantageous but vital to understanding cognition, 
particularly as it  intersects with excellence. And this as subjects of study, and as methodological 
tools and modes themselves. The overarching context is one of practical abilities that are displayed 
and rooted in corporeal kinetic cognition, i.e., intelligence originating in movement, touch, and 
corporeality intentionally  engaged in purposive practices such as sailing or dance. Moreover, to 
handle the inherently practical challenges requires a creative modus operandi and the exercise of 
skill. As Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues in The Roots of Thinking and elsewhere, movement has 
intrinsic gnostic possibilities, especially  when coupled to refined methodological analysis (1990). In 
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3 This is somewhat contentious, as Heather Reid argues Plato also sees the instrumental value of exercise and a fit body 
as he makes his case in the Republic regarding the proper education of the Guardians (Reid, H. 2007). 
this way Theoria becomes kinetic praxis – wise intelligence grounded in movement. Crucial to this 
is the view that animate movement, a body kinetically engaging its environment, enriches our lives 
cognitively and existentially. Further contentions are that knowledge and excellence thrive, ceteris 
paribus, in rich communitarian collaborative climates (entailing socially cognitive import), and that 
both originate in said intersubjective context.
Nonetheless, even if embodied cognition stands as a better alternative than cognitivist 
approaches, not least because of its eclectic interdisciplinary methodology that blends 
phenomenology with empirical research, I argue for additional inquiry  lines and methodologies. A 
first step  concerns nomenclature. I use “broad cognition” to refer to and emphasize the 
interdependency between theoretical and practical variants of knowledge (working in unison, they 
may alternate or be concurrent modes). Further, to distinguish the expanded line of investigation 
from conventional embodied cognition and to accentuate the role of movement in these practices 
and our cognition, I advance the designation “ameliorative animated cognition.” This better 
captures said broader notion, and more aptly describes what takes place constitutively and 
experientially. After all, the ubiquitous and pervasive term “embodied” can be redundant and may 
obfuscate the inquiry in some occasions, as Sheets-Johnstone points out (2009: 337). The 
nomenclature here attempts to remain closer to experience as afforded by moving bodies. 
To briefly explain and justify these terminological suggestions then: cognition, human or 
animal, is ameliorative in that learning is part of a process that seeks to improve the learner’s lot, to 
put it plainly. For evolutionary reasons, learning and knowledge are adaptive tools for organisms 
that face uncertain environmental conditions. This ameliorative facet brings with it  normative 
judgments that assess and determine better or worse conditions. If at first these simply seek the 
merely and evolutionarily expedient, in time they develop into ethical and aesthetic normative 
valuations. Next, animation is rooted in our very corporeality. This implies not only sensing 
external stimuli, but also primordially (in the sense of originally) proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
perceptions of our own bodies—among which tactile ones are paramount.  Something Sheets-
Johnstone demonstrates in her keen, meticulous analysis of evolutionary cases in The Roots of 
Thinking, where she considers bipedalism, tool making, cave art  and other cases (1990). Likewise, 
life and thinking imply movement. Thinking as presently  conceived is spatio-temporal in kinetic 
ways: animate, that is, kinetic bodies intentionally move in three-dimensional space; it is also 
inherently  temporal as thinking moves in time and entails different experiential feels and 
conceptualizations. Gallagher’s sophisticated analyses of temporality are apposite in this regard 
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(Gallagher, 2005: 189-199; Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 69-87). In short, temporality and movement 
are two coetaneous and fundamental aspects of thinking. Last, as argued above, our cognition is 
better understood presently  as coevally  incorporating intellectual and practical knowledge. These 
terminological changes issue as much from the need for clarity as from the outcomes of adopting 
the expanded canon to be discussed below. 
Next, I present the case to expand traditional research foci, a) from vision and artificial 
laboratory conditions to moving bodies in real life conditions,4 and b) from everyday abilities and 
average people or pathologically  affected individuals to skilled performance and individuals (the 
broader methodological palette proposed for cognitive studies in section 2 results from this). The 
idea is not to exclude present research lines, but to incorporate these alternatives on equal terms 
while amending the former when the alternate perspectives provide argumentative and empirical 
evidence to that end.
  1.1 Stepping outside of the visual laboratory and into the fray of things
In neuroscientific and philosophic discussion of abilities and states of consciousness classical 
cognitivism and cognitively embodied approaches emphasize vision as the perceptual mode to 
study, rely on artificial laboratory scenarios, and favor quantitative analyses, while the scarce real 
life, qualitative examples are undeveloped. Of course, there are very good reasons to study vision in 
laboratory settings, but in addition to overlooking that we also pay attention aurally, tactually and 
through the other senses (inclusive of kinesthesia and proprioception), this also ignores how vision 
is inherently coupled to our kinetic-tactile engagements (more often called ‘motor skills,’ a term 
more amenable to reification). Given the impracticality  of a full review of the extensive literature, it 
is more profitable to highlight a couple of concrete recent examples that are representative of 
standard research mores and work published. 
Robert Kentridge’s or Jesse Prinz’s current and extensive work on attention–our ability to 
focus–is a clear exponent of research that exclusively centers on eye-movement tracking in 
laboratory conditions. It is concerned with the allocation of gaze to primed regions. All of their 
examples, experiments, and data points are visual. This ignores the fact that our vision engages 
other senses in crossmodal ways, and also how our body posture and other movements of neck, 
head, shoulders, and the rest of the body  are integral to how we look at events in the world. When 
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4 After writing this section I encountered Sheets-Johnstone’s own misgivings regarding the preference of the visual in 
Western philosophy.  See The Roots of thinking, 318-323.
they  discuss the different domains of application of either attending or orienting as responses to 
stimuli, a kinetic scenario that involved both vision and our body reacting to stimuli holistically and 
ecologically  (in the sense of responsiveness to the surrounding environment) would prove more 
revealing. One such experiment could analyze empirically, via eye and joint markers, and 
phenomenologically, an actual (or virtual, for safety  and feasibility  reasons) bicycle descent where 
road surface obstacles and light conditions require orienting for precision rather than attending, yet 
rely  on the latter for anticipatory  responses (this process is actually  unintuitive and does not validate 
laboratory data and assumptions based on gaze allocation).
Alva Noë and Kevin O’Regan’s work on enactive perception has addressed this conceptually 
in conceiving of perception along the lines of tactility  rather than merely the visual (2001:79-103).5 
While the bold move to tie vision to touch is a game changer, and I concur with Noë’s anti-
internalist stance (with regard to at least some experiences) regarding perception and his skepticism 
for neural correlates or substrates as sufficient, the program remains anchored in vision (2004:210 
ff.). It is true that  the enactive stance needs to be validated conceptually and empirically, and that 
vision is the one sense on which we (think we) rely most conspicuously. Moreover, in spite of all 
the attention and resources (perhaps because of this to some extent), as Noë and Evan Thompson 
avow, vision remains incredibly  baffling for philosophers an scientists when it comes to explaining 
and understanding meaningful (visual) perception of the world given a lack of direct contact with 
said external environment (2002:2).6 Many problems remain, and these should be addressed. I do 
not contest the importance of laboratories, empirical work, and vision as perceptual phenomenon or 
investigative locus. But we should note how these remain limited and limiting in important ways, 
not the least of which is the artificiality of their scenarios. This would be fine were it  not for its 
uniqueness or primacy when what we seek ultimately  are insights that apply  to our living bodies. 
Surely we need to understand basic processes first, but this should not squander efforts to widen the 
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5 Incidentally, this vindicates R.G. Collingwood’s observations about Cezanne’s painting as primordially tactile. See 
Collingwood, R. G. 1958 The Principles of Art. New York: Oxford University Press. 144-146.  See also Sheets-
Johnstone on Paleolithic cave art and the tactile and three-dimensional qualities of the line, The Roots of Thinking. 250 
ff.
6  This assumes that we are not in direct contact with the world.  By paying attention solely to the visual we trap 
ourselves behind a veil of ignorance that has been with us since Descartes, Locke, and company. The alternative is to 
argue that in fact we are in direct contact. A Kantian solution would argue that we inhabit a phenomenal world, that is, 
we directly perceive phenomena as phenomena. We need not buy into Kant’s paradigm fully to avoid the Cartesian and 
Lockean trap that places the world behind epistemological ignorance. In fact, we are directly in contact by way of 
kinetic and tactile interaction with the environment. There is no perceived distance,  as is the case with eyesight, when 
we reach and touch something—it is telling that when we wish to check the real presence of something, reaching and 
touching is our test. Tactility is the criterion for an external world.
scope to obtain supplementary insights that may shed light on the original query and beyond—as is 
the case presently. 
Neither cursory  nor careful examination of the literature turn up much in the way of 
meticulous studies that focus on the cognitive aspect, broad or otherwise, of active pursuits in real 
life scenarios or settings designed to mirror them. Some philosophers and scientists resort to 
sporting images and scenarios when providing examples, but these are unerringly brief and merely 
illustrative. Noë himself mentions baseball as he criticizes Heidegger and existential 
phenomenology via Dreyfus, but this is merely illustrative and not central to the argument (as 
presented, it could readily be adapted by changing the emphasis) (2012:8-11). Later, in one of the 
more extended applications to an active pursuit  in the cognitive studies literature, he does discuss 
the world of baseball incisively and insightfully  in relation to perception and realism, but again, at 
one page this is pregnant with unrealized possibilities (2012:141-142). In short, detailed analyses on 
par with those conducted regarding the relevance of eye saccades for attention or aphasia and 
narrative identity, but concerned with bodies running, cycling, or fencing are missing. Stereotypical 
sensorimotor experiments typically rely on moving a joystick-controlled pointer on a screen. Hardly 
would this count as fully meaningful activity (or even merely meaningful movement) outside the 
laboratory. Moreover, no ethical or aesthetic issues derive from placing the cursor on target more or 
less times. 
This lack of rigorous examination of the activities themselves in real life is not only ascribable 
to researchers, but also to deft practitioners. When we look at those who engage in sports and active 
pursuits, their interpretations typically involve narratives of their exploits and sequential reports of 
the steps followed to succeed (or fail). These subjective and qualitative accounts are very valuable, 
but insufficient in ways that matter conceptually, scientifically, or phenomenologically: they rely on 
popular cultural expressions and memes that  hide rather than reveal the uniqueness of the 
experience (e.g., ‘being in the zone’; see section 2 for concrete examples); as first-person reports, 
they  are richly  anecdotal but fall short of minimal empirical requirements; and while revealing, they 
are found wanting phenomenologically in ways that give insight into invariant features of the 
structure of the experience itself. Given the commitments of and challenges faced by  the embodied 
cognition camp, these activities and corresponding analyses are a treasure trove waiting to be found 
as it lies in open view.
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If our bodily skills determine our perception largely, as Noë avows, and it is “a kind of skillful 
bodily  activity  on the part of the animal as a whole,” this means that we should also study  the whole 
system–vision, motor system or rather animated organism, movement, and environment–in action, 
preferably real world action (2004:2). 7 For as Gallagher and Zahavi write (with regard to brain-in-
vats equally but applicable here), “the brains we have are shaped by the bodies we have, and by our 
real world actions.” (2008:132. My emphasis) Otherwise, we decouple the phenomenon studied 
precisely from the sort of scenarios it evolved to handle. Moreover, this decoupling also affects the 
results we obtain in the laboratory: whether guided by  top down or bottom up models, so long as we 
remain under the spell of reductionism, this sometimes results in misinterpreted or misconstrued 
data. For one, neuroscientists and those designing the experiments may ask the wrong questions 
when led by mistaken assumptions or an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon. Gallagher 
and Zahavi’s discussion of experiments regarding agency, where the experimenters raised 
interesting questions regarding pre-reflective agency  but seemed confused about what they  were 
actually testing, illustrates this (2008:162-166). Because vision is vitally  tethered to movement, 
kinesthesia and tactility must complement matters. 
The recommendation is to study abilities in real life situations using qualitative analyses 
derived from personal accounts, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. A fruitful way to do this is to 
genuinely engage active pursuits. Even today, when embodied cognition is becoming a strong 
countercurrent to cognitivist  computational approaches, the lived body is not given its due in a full, 
genuine sense, as Sheets-Johnstone is wont to phrase it (1992; 2009). For one, there is no 
connection to real life scenarios where our cognition is fully engaged as we do in everyday life, 
from merely  moving about the office and the laboratory, to handling more perilous or demanding 
scenarios outdoors. Considering moving bodies in space and time engaged in pragmatic pursuits, of 
which the active practices under discussion are a privileged set, is philosophically  peremptory. 
Finally, and most pertinent, if we want to delve into the connection between the normative, 
understood to comprise the world of values–aesthetic, ethical–finding the neural correlates is not 
sufficient: these neural mappings do not distinguish between alternative values (where content is 
primordial to their significance). A further recommendation is to have both researchers and subjects 
swap professional garments and roles; there are veritable insights to be gained when lab coats are 
exchanged for running shorts, a dancer’s tights, or a craftsperson’s apron (these recommendations 
are developed in section 2).
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7 Our eyes, bodily organs, depend on bipedality, orientation of body and neck, and are aided by other senses (not to 
speak of crossmodal and synaesthetic possibilities). 
1.2 From normality and pathology to excellence
To briefly turn to the second suggestion on how to expand the canon (it will lead to 
normativity under the auspices of cognition). Prevalent research foci center on common abilities by 
average people carrying out simple or mundane tasks, and on pathologies that  put  to the test 
assumptions or debunk theories. For Gallagher and Zahavi, “Pathological cases can function 
heuristically to make manifest what is normally  or simply taken for granted” in order to gain 
distance from the familiar, something their detailed analysis of pathologies of the self concerning 
our awareness of agency and ownership clearly shows (2008:140; 208-212 for pathologies of the 
self). Gallagher’s illuminating analysis of pathologies as he considers lack of proprioception and its 
consequences, prenoetic aspects not reducible to neurophysiology, or the convoluted consequences 
of schizophrenia amply justify  such agenda (2005). Legitimate and crucial as this work is, we had 
better capitalize on an underrepresented area to fruitfully  supplement current efforts, namely the 
inclusion of highly skilled performance and exemplar individuals. Just as when we study movement 
we look at the slow movers (sloths), those in the intermediate range (humans and dogs), and the fast 
ones (the cheetahs and falcons), we need to study inferior, normal, and superior performers. 
Additionally, this will show how cognitive studies can explore the convergence between cognition 
and normativity as it issues from kinetic skills constrained by practice-determined rules.
There are a number of reasons why the study of excellence and elite performers is advisable: 
representativeness, inspiration, corroboration or invalidation of scientific truths or dogma, and 
others. Of course, we should be wary  that outliers may skew findings. Therefore, this is also a call 
for careful methodology. But, a true understanding of animate movement cannot ignore those 
accomplished individuals who are superb performers. They show the possibilities of movement and 
test our assumptions. Further, this proves both inspiring, and vets orthodox positions. Much as we 
respond better to positive feedback, this approach may be not only inspiring to those of us who 
struggle to better ourselves and cultivate our abilities, but can also show cognitively  broad 
possibilities both in terms of theoretical insight as to what and why may be the case for us as a 
species, and in terms of practical application and knowledge of what we may be possible to develop 
personally. 
Congruent with the ameliorative facet of broad cognition under discussion, there are those 
individuals or collaborations that result in novel and extraordinary performances, feats, or results 
that move forward practices to new levels (keeping in mind that these individuals’ achievements are 
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possible because of the community within which they operate): novel artistic techniques are 
developed, such as Helen Frankenthaler’s unique technique of making oil look like watercolors on 
canvas in her iconic and groundbreaking Mountains and Sea, or Johann Sebastian Bach’s 
innovative use of the thumb to play  the piano, athletic skills invented, pace Richard Fosbury and his 
revolutionary  high-jump technique or Scot cyclist Graeme Obree’s “superman position” for time 
trials (eventually  banned by the UCI), or to pick a non-human example consider Imo, the Japanese 
macaque that in 1953 discovered how to wash potatoes in water, then separate rice from sand 
(which was taken up by  its colony and subsequently passed along to posterior generations).8  In 
these cases, a new development, cognitively broad epistemologically, results in a marked 
improvement. These also imply kinetic performances with particular kinesthetic and proprioceptive 
perceptions peculiar to them and dependent on abled movement. With this, we arrive at the doorstep 
of excellence under the rubric of active pursuits. 
2. Active pursuits, Excellence, and Cognition
2.1 From activity to values by way of the cognitive
To best understand how to excel, which entails varied cognitive modes; we need to expand the 
customary study from common abilities and performers to exemplar performances and masters. 
This is the realm of excellence. As such it already comes imbued with normative import, for to 
excel is to surpass, as its Latin root informs us. This implies qualitative and/or quantitative 
comparisons that lead to value judgments—normative turf. To keep matters simple I presently  focus 
on sports –with occasional mention of other practices – but ceteris paribus this is readily applicable, 
with pertinent modifications, to performing and martial arts, games, and crafts.9
Of the many theories that have been put  forth to explain the inner workings of sport interpretivism 
or broad internalism stands out as “the most powerful theory of its kind developed in the philosophy 
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8 http://factsanddetails.com/japan.php?itemid=887&catid=26&subcatid=164. Accessed 10/29/2012.  For a discussion 
on the macaque’s achievement in terms of patterns of rationality see Margolis’s Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, 120.
9 Of course, there are key and irreducible differences among them. Sports, traditional martial arts, and performing arts 
or crafts pursue excellence but have very different goals that affect key aspects of this analysis: the first 
paradigmatically focus on results and winning, and the second on the process and the quality of the moves themselves; 
dance or theater focus on exploring movement itself or a particular character’s personality respectively; crafts such as 
woodworking or swordsmithing either seek to develop new techniques or to emulate past masters as they attempt to 
recreate forgotten techniques.
of sport literature,” as William Morgan states (2012: 65).10  Broad internalism argues that: (1) 
Metaphysically, sports and games are constituted by an internal logic guided by specific rules, 
called constitutive. The internal logic of an activity or practice sets the practical and conceptual 
boundaries to an activity and uniquely distinguishes it from others. Basque handball (pelota) differs 
from handball in the US because the constitutive rules specify different kinds of materials for the 
ball, equipment and permissible moves. The former does not allow the use of gloves; the ball is 
much harder; the scoring and physical locales differ. (Other types of sporting rules are restorative, 
which redress imbalances in the game, and of skill, which are the physical and tactical abilities that 
the activity in question engages, such as dribbling with the feet in soccer); (2) Sports are best 
engaged in for reasons intrinsic to the activity as constituted by  the conditions the rules spell out 
and which determine their proper internal goods—those we can only obtain by engaging in the 
activity (becoming a better dribbler in soccer), and more importantly; 3) “sport is grounded in 
general normative principles that determine its main purpose(s).” (Morgan, 2012:63)11  The 
background of a community is crucial (and distinguishes this from formalism in sport philosophy—
where rules suffice to define the ontology of games).12 Broad internalism embraces two key human 
qualities, fairness and striving for athletic excellence (as bound with certain notion of human 
flourishing), and derives from these its normative principles (Morgan, 2012: 68-69). Importantly  for 
our purposes here, sports under this rubric are tests of physical excellence that are cashed out as 
kinetic enterprises.
How the internal goods are obtained, and the way we excel in sport is key. Not any way of 
playing, performing, scoring or winning will do to count as excellent (winning does not result in 
excellence if the win is achieved through cheating, for example). The cultivation of sporting 
excellence requires us to develop specific skills conducive to achieving the stipulated goal within 
the limitations imposed by said rules: in tennis we are to successfully pass a tennis ball over a net 
and have it bounce in a particular area on the court after hitting it with a racquet of specific 
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10  Also referred to as “interpretive broad internalism” or “internalism.” To differentiate it from internalism in 
philosophy of mind, I use “broad internalism.” Formalism and conventionalism are the two main alternative theories. 
For seminal discussions of this see Russell’s “Broad internalism and the moral foundations of sport” and Simon’s 
“Internalism and internal values in sport.” For an extended and extremely readable defense of internalism across the full 
spectrum of sport in Spanish, see Torres’ Gol de media cancha. 
11 Morgan embraces the broad internalist stance in so far as sport is more than a formal system, but disagrees with the 
abstract normative principles it embraces, arguing for social deep conventions in their stead. Settling this being far from 
my concerns here, what I propose may find a third option between these two camps by grounding some of this 
normative force in animate bodies and their onto and philogenetic development.
12  Bernard Suits is the best exponent of formalism. He took the gauntlet thrown by Wittgenstein regarding the 
(im)possibility of defining what a game is. See his The Grasshopper. 
dimensions; to do well in soccer requires the cultivation of specific skills developed to deal with the 
restrictions imposed by soccer’s constitutive rules, and which result in a better soccer performance. 
Thus, we need to become deft in the art of dribbling, kicking, passing, lobbing, etc. These abilities 
are proper of the game, and can only be cultivated and enjoyed by playing the game, as Ilundáin 
and Torres show when analyzing esthetic and ethical aspects of soccer connected to the internal 
logic of the game (2010:185-196). The refined athletic skills are broadly  cognitive, and because 
norms issue from the interplay of constitutive rules and the resultant quality of the game vis à vis 
said rules, ethical and aesthetic judgments derive from the cognitive sphere. In short, the norms are 
derived from the coupling of abilities with the rules.
To clarify, the constitutive rules spell out the applicable tactical and physical excellences—
kinetically  intelligent ways that are central to normative compliance and athletically  performing 
excellence. In other words, engaging a practice requires us to buy  into a set of performing and 
normative constraints–we need to perform well under those restrictions— constraints that 
paradoxically are the doorway to freedom and creativity (see section 3.b). This also enables us to 
develop a set of capabilities as per standards of excellence set by a community  under whose aegis a 
practice takes place. Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of practices originally  develops this idea of 
practices that  obtain their standards of excellence from communities (1984).13  The rules and the 
ability  of the contrary  in competitive situations entail that we refine our ability to meet this 
challenge. The ideal scenario is one where, as Scott Kretchmar explains, a sweet tension develops 
between the challenge and our abilities (1972:23-30).14 Now, these rules and the resulting skills are 
fundamentally bound to the kind of animate beings we are and our particular animate physiology, 
evolved over time, among which our bipedal means of locomotion, opposable thumb, and hand 
dexterity  are most conspicuous. To consider this from the opposite direction I have been arguing 
that: our corporeality, which dynamically grounds kinetic and kinesthetic elements, enables us to 
move in certain ways that the constitutive rules exploit to set the less efficient means that result in 
particular sports. These in turn lead to performances imbued with normativity in virtue of their 
being assessed qualitatively/quantitatively inferior, average, or superior. From whichever end we 
look at this, the normative rises from cognitively broad elements rooted in our animate bodies.
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13  For a concrete application and critique of his apparatus in relation to soccer see, Ilundáin-Agurruza and Kuleli’s “A 
New Heart for Turkish Soccer: a virtue ethics diagnosis and treatment.”
14 For a discussion of sweet tension from a phenomenological perspective see McLaughlin & Torres’ “Sweet tension 
and its phenomenological description: sport, intersubjectivity, and horizon.”
Discussing athletic excellence leads to what the literature terms “skillful coping,” and to how 
the normative partially but constitutively derives from cognitive concerns and abilities. Before 
delving into this, another terminological alteration is in order. In the case of everyday agents, 
speaking of “skillful coping” seems fitting, as most of us cope better or worse to perform on any 
given task relying on our more or less developed abilities. However, in the case of experts, I 
contend that the term “skillful fluency” is more apt. Fluency  is, as the dictionary points out, 
gracefulness and ease of movement or style (New Oxford American Dictionary: online).15 Fluent 
feats elicit the proverbial effortlessness where the pole-vaulter soars and seems to hang mid-air, 
defying gravity, as she turns her body to gracefully clear the bar. Of course, it is not actually 
effortless (nor mindless); there is an economy of movement and gracefulness that makes even 
experienced practitioners look like novices in comparison. Fluent athletes are not coping but 
excelling. Their fluid movements spell excellence as they perform. 
As situated and dynamic animate beings with pragmatic concerns, presently  sporting ones, we 
cultivate these abilities through a broad cognitive process where our kinetic intelligence is fully 
integrated (in able practitioners rather than novices–this is a continuum obviously). A key aspect of 
superior performance entails how to handle a situation with skillful fluency. This has a concurrent 
bivalence where such skill cashes out as bodily fluency and style that a) are a kinetic and kinesthetic 
process, and b) entail a built-in value judgment (hence normative) that, based on the specified rules, 
determines whether it counts as excellent or not. They  are but one and the same movement and 
process, separable only in analysis. The result is that a broad cognitive process tethered to dynamic 
animate bodies and their kinetic possibilities when attempting to solve a challenge or problem, in 
this case sportive, concurrently  implicates judgments of cognitive, aesthetic, or moral value, e.g. a 
record winning Tour de France time trial requires exquisite synchrony between body and tool, 
knowledge of one’s ability and state for proper effort management, and may  be beautiful and 
admirable (or tainted if EPO played a role16). 
Moreover, sports and active pursuits elicit ethical responses from us, and while they are not the only 
ways to develop  character (sometimes they result in the contrary), they provide testing grounds that 
show our mettle as truth-seeking endeavors, as Heather Reid argues (2009). A free solo climber 
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15 Online search 10/29/12.
16 The performance-enhancing drug makes the athlete more efficient in a way that contravenes the very rules that make 
the activity possible.  Further, it brings unfairness in the sense that the “doped” body recovers better from efforts during 
training in ways that non-enhanced athletes cannot do, so it is not only a matter of performing better on the day of the 
event itself.
such as Alex Honnold–he climbed Yosemite’s The Nose without ropes–certainly needs courage and 
temperance; a weightlifter needs resilience and determination to day after day  perform the same 
sequences of movements while lifting thousands of kilos of steel. In confronting their sport’s 
particular challenges, they test themselves, finding out whether they are wanting or not. 
To illustrate the argumentative thrust with a pivotal theme: practitioners and writers in popular 
and academic literature write about  and refer to high-performance states in athletic, martial, and 
other events as peak performances, flow or, more vernacularly, “being in the zone.” However, 
prevalent psychological accounts, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, or philosophical ones, Drew Hyland, 
John Searle, and Hubert Dreyfus fail to adequately capture the nature of these extraordinary 
experiences by reducing them to psychological processes, mysterious phenomena, pre-intentional 
background conditions, or absorbed, mindless coping—in that order (2008: 1990; 1983; 1992). 
Introspective accounts weigh heavily in this regard, since such experiences are assumed to be 
“unobservable mental phenomena,” and thus many researchers rely on said personal narratives to 
illustrate or validate their results or incorporate them directly as empirical data under the rubric of 
“verbal reports.” But relying on others’ personal accounts alone necessarily ties them to the quality 
of said reports (a reason for “embedded” researchers and trained subjects, for more often than not 
the quality is mediocre). Athletes and performers resort to common tropes and ubiquitous banalities 
reported ad nauseam by journalists and popular science writers. For example, in risk sports, the key 
word is “adrenaline,” or in endurance sports or performances the aforementioned being “in the 
zone” or “in the flow.” To wit, consider Marsh’s interview of Gerard Butler about his role in 
Chasing Mavericks, a film about surfing legend Frosty Hesson (2012). It  is awash in references to 
adrenaline rushes that, far from shedding light  on the experience of a surfer’s flow, hide the 
phenomenon.
These subjective reports are often legitimized by being connected to neurophysiological 
accounts. Such neurological accounts do explain the physiology of the experience, but they are 
unable to explain the experience itself, its qualitative facet as felt by the lived body, its significance, 
or ultimately the why of courting risk with that particular activity. If it were the adrenaline rush, 
then driving recklessly without a seatbelt would do just as well. On the contrary, these activities 
require careful planning and much training and skill. They are rooted in one’s particular abilities 
and dispositions. Even if they may begin somewhat accidentally, by the time one is skillful these are 
quite deliberate. Immanuel Kant’s ideas on the sublime are better suited to illuminate the 
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significance and inner structure of such “extreme” experiences as a combination of the awe and 
attraction that the sublime elicits in us (Ilundáin, 2007).
There are certain invariants that structure these exceptional performances and experiences, 
notably the aforementioned fluency where intense focus on the task at hand toggles between 
conscious and unconscious attention and orienting. These performances are not accidental; such 
superb performers regularly operate at extraordinary  levels. This opens the possibility of a feedback 
loop between enhanced performance and discrimination regarding the qualitative aspects of the 
experience. Context also matters, and a richer cultural background also enhances the experience in 
ways novices or outsiders cannot fathom (Krein and Ilundáin, forthcoming).17  When teenagers 
bungee jump or pull 360’s on skateboards, they may get “a rush,” as they would say, but this pales 
in comparison with the experience of Samadhi by a Zen monk, or the focus and finesse of a samurai 
of the stature of Munenori Yagyu or Musashi Miyamoto when they acted in a mushin (no-mind) 
state. Of course, a direct translation of mushin is misleading, with many assuming some sort  of 
mindlessness, when in actuality  there is extreme concentration (but no distraction) (ibid). That is, 
these excellent performances allow for richer analyses.
Elite athletes and performers, master craftspeople, sensei, if reflective and sophisticated 
enough, when examining their experiences may be able to discriminate kinesthetic phenomena to a 
degree that surpasses that of normal practitioners—making us think that to swim in the rapids they 
must be ghosts or sprites. Not only  are they able to perform to extraordinary  levels, but these afford 
unique kinesthetic experiences in remarkable environments and situations within which to display 
their skill in ways foreclosed to most of us: climbing certain peaks in particular conditions (no 
rope); surfing a 50-foot wave; skiing down a 60 degree mountain slope; or handling a tool (racquet, 
bicycle, rapier) as if it  were truly part of their body. This goes beyond Martin Heidegger’s analysis 
of handling a hammer that becomes part of our “bodily schema,” to echo Gallagher’s 
conceptualization, until something goes wrong and we become aware of it  again (2005:23-24). My 
contention is that expert tool-incorporations show the insufficiency of the German 
phenomenologist’s position. 
The way to gain an understanding of this process is to study and describe the moving bodies 
themselves from inside and outside: those that excel are easy to observe, and a trained eye, 
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17 Krein & Ilundáin, Mushin and Flow.  We also discuss how Vegard Moe’s critiques of Searle’s analysis of skillful 
performances (2005; 2007), and Gunnar Brevik’s of Dreyfus account of mindless coping (2007) show the need to 
rethink these phenomena in ways that interweave conscious and unconscious states.
particularly one attuned to the process and experiences the performer is undergoing goes a long 
way. Obviously, one thing is to experience something, another to discriminate its qualia, and a 
different and more challenging one yet to articulate it. In addition to rich experiences, for our 
purposes we need to be able to understand these conceptually and express them. It may be that the 
very discrimination and experience is enhanced or changed in virtue of this very articulation. 
Additionally, a rigorously engaged and reflective subjectivity is in order. In this regard, 
phenomenology is ideal. A systematic phenomenological analysis is able and requisite to describe 
and establish the inner and objective structure of such experiences. This permits said states to 
legitimately mark the condition of excellent performance. In this sense, proper training of the 
subjects to be interviewed and worked with–sports practitioners, performers or craftsmen– would 
go a long way to obtain more meaningful and illuminating reports. Moreover, the scope of such 
experiences, when rather than sporadic are the result of devoted training, transcends them and 
marks not only a state but a status: that of someone who has reached the requisite level of mastery. 
Last, standards of excellence and training are needed to make such experiences not accidental but 
predictably repetitive, which requires said inner structure to be in place to allow for the needed 
stability  over time. In sum, a blend of normative and cognitive facets underwrites these kinds of 
states.18  And as just pointed out, if they are to be meaningful and amenable to being articulated, a 
reflective analysis is requisite. This takes us to methodological considerations.
2.2 Methodological and Disciplinary Matters 
This next development of the cognitive canon asks for supplementary methodologies and 
broader interdisciplinarity. Cognitive studies use extensively experimental tools and technologies, 
as well as computational models to obtain the empirical data that feeds their theoretical frameworks. 
With regard to the active pursuits discussed here, sensorimotor skills, neural correlates, and other 
physiological data that connect brain to organs or muscular response, coupled sometimes to 
biomechanical analysis, prevail. However, it is the lived body  that is central to this revamped 
program. This escapes predominant methods that tend to reify these dynamics into brains, neurons, 
and static bodily images and schemas, as Sheets-Johnstone argues (2009: 328-349).  Of course, 
biology  and its quantitative, analytical, and statistical methodologies—so long as reductionistic 
tendencies are avoided—is essential to furbish empirical evidence, and much of the above natural 
scientific studies are quite pertinent. But on their own, they are half the picture. As the previous 
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18 Plural because mushin is experientially distinct from flow and skillful coping. The underlying structures,  in virtue of 
being embedded in different cultural contexts affect the experiences constitutively. 
section advances, phenomenology is the bridge between the subjective and the invariant structures 
of our kinesthetic and kinetic-tactile experiences, our living bodies in movement, as well as a 
formidable tool to conceptually  express experience such that we may refine our discriminatory 
powers. Whether and how this might capture not just the structure but the content (qualia) of 
experience is a different issue partially addressed below.
There are a number of phenomenological modalities that naturalize phenomenology, some 
attempting to integrate various aspects of the natural sciences de facto (whether this is feasible and 
conceptually consistent is a problem beyond this study’s scope) while others simply take 
phenomena to be accessible to empirical inquiry and compatible with phenomenological method. 
Of the latter, two amenable to this proposal are neurophenomenology19  and front-loaded 
phenomenology, (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008:33-40). The former, in addition to implementing 
dynamic systems analysis and biological empirical data also trains subjects, while the latter builds 
into the experiment the phenomenological insights desired, which is useful when one wishes test 
subjects to remain in the dark about what is being tested (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008:33, 38). 
Relying on these investigative varieties enhances our ability to explain motile experience. 
To take this further, beyond Lutz’s et al. neurophenomenological experiments on vision for 
example (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008:35-38), or the now widespread study of meditative 
techniques via EEG and fMRI of meditating Buddhist monks, which remain focused on passive 
endeavors where stillness is the trademark, the proposal is to study  the active pursuits mentioned 
“in the field of action” to bring activity, and hence the dynamics of movement itself, into the 
inquiry. Thus, another way to integrate phenomenology, besides training subjects, is for researchers 
to embed themselves in the practice, much as anthropologists become part of the communities they 
wish to study. A phenomenologist becoming deft in or at least very  familiar with the activity  under 
study is a must. After all, the phenomenologist must master the subject under study—being merely 
an observer does not cut it  when it  comes to studying these activities. Part of the problem with 
many accounts of skillful performance is that these are not grounded in the practices themselves but 
on cogitations from the sidelines oftentimes. Searle or the Dreyfus brothers’ may engage in some of 
the activities they  discuss, but said familiarity does not impact their work deeply or explicitly 
enough—a depth akin and parallel to ethnographic work in the field that I endorse here. 
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19 The paradigmatic text for this program is The embodied mind. 
Alternatively, researchers who are already engaged in any sort of active pursuit would best 
carry  out said phenomenological analysis. Part of the challenge is dealing with the stigma of 
justifying such enterprise: doing “research” on the golf course, the ocean’s waves, or a mountain’s 
face is bound to elicit derision among more sedate colleagues. But when researchers do, the results 
speak for themselves with revealing, true to the experiences and facts studies. In a recent article, 
Gunnar Breivik provides a very insightful phenomenological analysis of extreme sports based on 
his own experiences (2011). Breivik, a consummate phenomenologist, considers three sports he 
engages to varying levels of mastery–skydiving, white water kayaking, and climbing–as modes of 
play  with the environment (2011:319). Incorporating and critically  amending Heidegger’s lack of 
explicit  focus on the use of the body via Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Samuel Todes, Breivik 
considers performers, natural environment, and most illuminatingly, applies five phenomenological 
variables to each sport –body  posture, skill, spatiality, temporality, and decision-making–to show 
the particular lifeworlds of experience they afford. 
Additionally, hermeneutics is another methodology with much to bring to the table in the way 
of interpretive synthesis of evidence. We need to interpret  our kinesthetic perceptions, not just 
describe them, particularly when trying to fit them into a bigger context. Sometimes the available 
facts are inadequate or too limited by themselves, and we then need a reasonable interpretation. 
Moreover, some active pursuits are designed to be interpreted, such as dances and other 
performances (theatrical, oral stories, etc.); and complex cultural phenomena such as traditional 
games or events like the encierro (running of the bulls) beg for discerning hermeneutic 
interpretation if we are to capture their complexity as paradigms of risky activity  (Ilundáin 2007b). 
To stay with the bulls a bit longer, we can then analyze the event looking for the underlying 
structure of risky activities to explain the deeper source of the motivation to run or climb. Thus, I 
explain the appeal of the encierro not psychologically but by highlighting and examining the 
interplay  between the fear of death–engaging Heidegger’s and Jean Paul Sartre’s takes on the grim 
reaper to this end–and the joy that arises from skillful playing with bulls (Ilundáin 2008b: 20-25, 
30-32). Finally, incorporating active pursuits as enacted into research agendas also requires creative 
experiment design and development of new techniques and technologies, in addition to being open 
to other disciplines oft dismissed as too “soft,” esoteric, or simply unscientific, about which more 
momentarily.
Cognitive studies have seen a growing and fertile collaboration among neuroscientists, 
psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, biologists, physiologists, and even physicists, to name the 
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most salient ones. And yet, there is a case to be made for a broader cross-cultural interdisciplinarity 
that brings into the fold not just the sciences (whether hard, like physics, soft, such as anthropology 
or sociology, or a hybrid, say  paleoanthropology) or scientifically  oriented branches of philosophy, 
but also the humanities and arts as de facto partners: history, literature (creative writing and 
critical),20  musicology, linguistics, art (as practice and study), numerous others—of different 
cultural origins and times—that can help  us refine present ways to conceptualize, understand, and 
articulate animate experience. I briefly elaborate on historiography next.
Studying a particular period’s documents, historiography when coupled to hermeneutical and 
phenomenological work proves useful and revealing. Neuroscientist Amishi Jha, currently 
conducting research on mindfulness techniques and brain functionality at the University of Miami, 
has as driving question in one of her projects, whether such techniques can help  soldiers become 
less reactive and more attentive (Breining, 2012). While the data she may obtain, tied to working 
memory as key factor, will prove quite apposite to understanding the process, the answer has been 
in the books for over four hundred years. Looking at bushido, its coda, and samurai culture, which 
integrated mindfulness techniques along with Zen Buddhism into its martial practices, provides a 
deeper look into the phenomenon. Additionally, this also may show the relevance, or not, of the 
larger cultural and philosophical context behind any given practice. Does the Buddhist view of life 
affect the expediency of results? Krein and I think so (forthcoming). In a related manner, Kenjutsu 
manuals, Japanese texts that  codify  the art of swordsmanship  in light of Zen, Daoist, and Confucian 
principles, are a related and fertile source to investigate the attunement of tool–the sword–with the 
moving body  while benefiting from extremely  keen observations on how attention, awareness, the 
subconscious, and performance interrelate dynamically.21
3. New Frontiers: sketches on intersubjectivity, creativity, the extended mind, 
disability, and interspecies cognition
The following sketches offer quick, vigorous brushstrokes on their way to either point out 
consequences of the above program or suggest research venues amenable to and resulting from this 
disciplinary expansion and modification of cognitive studies.
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20 “Érase una vez …las fabulosas tribulaciones filosóficas del deporte, la niñez, y la sabiduría,” recursively integrates 
play and literature as part of the philosophical process to understand the phenomenon of sports,  play, and the 
imagination in the context of childhood (Ilundáin, 2008a). For a highly modified version in English see, “Weaving the 
Magic: Philosophy, Sports and Literature,” (Ilundáin, 2011).
21 Chapter 5 of my forthcoming monograph Skillful Striving,“Reflections on a Katana: Japanese thought and the pursuit 
of mastery” explores these issues.
 3.1.  Intersubjectivity
The previous analysis shows how the normative issues forth from the formal and social 
constraints and the requisite kinetic-tactile skills of a given active practice. A community is the 
background condition that makes this possible in the first place—this entails insights from social 
cognition. This communitarian facet leads to a fruitful line of inquiry that connects the present 
discussion of broad cognition and values to the topic of other minds. To cover this briefly but 
suggestively then: if there is a point of contact between Heidegger and MacIntyre, it lies in how 
their views bypass the problem of other minds in virtue of the relevance and role that other people 
play. They differ on the methodology and theoretical approach, but the lesson to be taken is the 
same: there is no such problem.22 
Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological analysis of our relation with the They  or the Other 
makes it clear that we are always absorbed in relationships with others, “They  are encountered from 
out of the world, in which concernfully  circumspective Dasein essentially dwells (1962:155 
[119]).”23  We cannot help but encounter others. And we do so by either solicitude (fürsorge), a 
concern for the other’s welfare, or by being absorbed by the other in everyday  (concerns that often 
end in idle talk for instance where the negative aspects of a communitarian life arise for him) 
(1962:163-168 [126-130]). To bring this back to active pursuits, these are rich environments within 
which to undertake a phenomenological analysis à la Heidegger where we may find the essential 
structure of our experiences with others, and use this to analyze team dynamics, relations between 
competitors, and those between sportspeople and fans (and likewise, vet the framework empirically 
within this context). We can rest assured the contraries have minds, only they come as animated 
bodies we can read.
More optimistic about our relations with others (if mistrusting of institutions), MacIntyre’s 
virtue ethics approach to practices means that excellence thrives, all things being equal, under a rich 
communitarian collaborative climate that provides standards of excellence (1981:190-193). I wish 
to take this further and contend, in light of the previous discussion, that our cognitively broad 
capabilities also thrive in this context. It is in the company of others—with traditions and 
communities that provide standards of excellence and gnostic repositories—that we find the 
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22  Chapter 4 of Skillful Striving, “The Eye of the Hurricane: embodiment, skilled action, and kinetic intelligence” 
explores intersubjectivity, other minds,  and the connection between the subjective and objective facets of consciouness 
via Witgenstein’s  Private Language Argument. 
23 His emphasis. Bracketed pagination refers to Heidegger’s original.
requisite knowledge, the nurturing environment to best learn, and the framework to be both 
challenged and supported in bringing out the best in us;24  it is alongside others that we come to 
learn our human ways. In other words, intersubjectivity is the door to self-development: 
ontogenetically, and starting with the most basic skills of facial recognition and moving on to 
sporting or linguistic abilities we develop within such communitarian environments.25  Active 
pursuits, undeniably  and essentially depend on such a social context. In short, for both German and 
Scot, we start and develop as part of communities.26
3.2 Creativity and imagination 
In the case of sports and many active pursuits, constraints imposed by the rules are the path to 
creativity and freedom. For one, these are voluntarily minded simply because they make the activity 
possible. We choose not to put the golf ball in the pocket to then walk and make a hole in one 
because the rules specify  the inefficient means of doing so by hitting the ball with a club. This in 
turn makes us develop skills and strategies within those rules. As discussed above, this can also lead 
to ingenious solutions within those rules. Movement is also constrained by morphological factors, 
our anatomy and physiology, as well as environmental elements (gravity being a weighty one), 
which are codetermined. More interestingly, there is a co-determination between agent and 
environment first proposed by Jakob von Uexküll’s novel work on biology and his notion of the 
umwelt (2010). That is, there is a mirroring co-dependence between the human or animal and the 
environment as they interact whereby they influence and adapt mutually: the bees’ vision adapts to 
the ultraviolet colors of the flowers and the latter modify their color spectrum to fit the bees as well. 
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24  These communities and the varied kinetic opportunities to engage the environment also lead to a culturally 
comparative analysis of excellence and cognition. While there may be pan-cultural invariants ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically that bind us into a common humanity (our animate movement is rooted in bipedal locomotion for 
instance with all that this entails),  these give rise to multiple cultural expressions. Far from sneaking in any sort of 
ethical or epistemological relativism, this makes things interesting philosophically and experientially.
25 It is feasible to derive a basic virtue ethics framework from a dynamic corporeality. As a species, there are certain 
kinesthetic, kinetic,  and corporeal invariants that result in certain interactions with the environment. Our very bodies are 
a source of needs and I cans—to echo Husserl. The invariants establish basic needs and ways to flourish.   Such needs, if 
not met constitute harms. Basic value judgments and valuations arise from these. This is the basis for a common ethics 
that begins not in disembodied rational imperatives, authority, or even utilitarian calculations, but is grounded on 
objective psychosomatic needs. Virtue ethics is a promising ground on which to plant this seed since it relies on habit 
and character, developments that occur within a community whose telos is human flourishing. For an illuminating book 
on harm and needs see Thomson’s Needs.
26 Moreover, movement implies an external world: we move in space, which lies outside of us.  It also entails an inside 
to us, kinesthetic and proprioceptive sensations (not private ones; we can observe these; evidence form mirror neurons 
supports this also). This inside is not a Cartesian ghost, but corporeal through and through. Different from observing 
motion, it also implies the feeling of moving oneself in that space. Cartesian imaginings of a world in the mind take this 
for granted—even the illusion of movement passes by having learned how to move before we can question it; what 
Descartes describes is motion in space and forsakes the ontogenetic development of spatial relations through movement. 
A number of luminaries have built on von Uexküll’s insight, with José Ortega y Gasset doing 
so first (2005), then adopted by Sheets-Johnstone (2009) as well as Varela et al. subsequently 
(1991). From a metaphysical stance, this has import for us existentially, as the very constraints (of 
the practices and/or environment) entail the challenge and possibility for creative free play, 
expanded movement repertoires, and richer experiences. For our purposes, an interesting case is 
found in sailing, where we find a dynamic environment of boat-ocean-wind and the sailor as they 
mutually  adapt. More interestingly, the very restrictions of having to deal with wind and water 
currents–we cannot sail into the wind, for example–lead to creative moves and an exploration of 
said freedom born from limitations (Ilundáin et al., 2012:117-119).
3.3 The Extended Mind
The idea of the extended mind, that our cognition is partly  located in the external 
environment, is hotly  debated in contemporary  philosophical circles, as Richard Menary makes 
patently  clear (2010). One way to address the issue is to observe, analyze, and incorporate insights 
acquired from highly-skilled athletes, craftspeople, or performers (some may be philosophers, 
scientists themselves) who, working with tools or interacting with the environment, couple 
kinesthetically in ways that extend normal human skills and discriminatory and experiential 
possibilities. Climbers who can “read” mountain faces to find seemingly  impossible lines, surfers 
and kayakers who also read water and rocks like open big-print books, sailors whose boat becomes 
like an extension of their persona, or woodworkers or metalworkers who handle their tools as 
veritable corporeal extensions can help reveal how our cognition may be outsourced and genuinely 
coupled to the external environment by way of refined skills such that the inner/outer distinction is 
one of degree and not kind—the porosity of the frontier depending on the skill level and level of 
reflection… all part of a process of self-cultivation. This may  lead to a better understanding and 
perhaps more meaningfully  warrant for experiences where one feels at one with tool or rock or 
water. In other words, since movement involves a kinesthetically aware body kinetically and 
tactilely  engaging with and coupled to the environment in mutually responsive ways, analysis of 
these pursuits also implies norms and ways that implicate extended models of the mind.
3.4 Disability
Another venue of cognitive study  is presented by  disability. Disabled people are perhaps the 
physical counterparts to those affected by mental pathologies (to play  the dualist game for 
contrasting effect, for the latter’s pathology is rooted in the body, and the former’s body also affects 
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their intellectual and emotional engagements with the world). Movement by disabled people is 
often characterized as flawed; the very phrasing of ‘dis-able’ conceptually  labeling it as defective. 
But as technology advances, prejudices are abandoned, and techniques improve, new forms and 
possibilities of movement arise that challenge our ideas of how a body can or should move, e.g., 
double leg amputee Oscar Pistorius’ performances against abled athletes.27At times, the very 
disability  gives an edge in athletic endeavor, then the “disabled” excel in virtue of their very 
“disability”–we can say  they transcend their limitation and become “over-able.” For example, 
Kevin Connolly is a skier without legs or hips, whose lower center of gravity allows him to sky 
where “normal” skiers cannot (Solomon, 2010). These novel I Cans, to echo Husserl’s apt  coinage, 
in the history of humankind bring into focus a hybridization of humans and technology that require 
us to devise new conceptual contours and procedural methods to understand their import of who we 
are, and give its due to a long-in-the-making revaluation of “disabled” people and their capabilities.
3.5 Interspecies Behavioral Exploration 
Our species has long interacted with other species, resulting in domesticated stock and pets; a 
relationship  long studied by ethologists, who often detail the many benefits of said symbiotic 
arrangement. For instance, the healthful effects for autistic children of close contact with horses or 
dolphins. However, such interactions have not often been investigated sub specie kinesis or 
cognitio. We know that species are primed to respond to those of their same species, even in cases 
where there is radical morphological variability as is the case with dogs (Autier-Dérian et al, 2013). 
But, are there interspecies invariants of a kinetic-tactile nature? How does interspecies 
intersubjectivity work and what does it  mean? There are largely  unexplored possibilities not  only of 
analysis, but also of interaction with non-domesticated, untamed, or wild animals in their natural 
environment—that is, on their terms—and in ethically sensitive ways.
There is “an art and science” to be developed and cultivated—it requires the development of 
proper skills and methods—to properly interact with these animals. It promises rich insights 
scientifically, since acquired observations would be minimally disruptive and maximally afford 
close personal observation.  It also portends existentially enriching experiences, as few experiences 
compare to sharing a space and moving with a whale, shark or fighting bull. Much like dance 
improvisation, these encounters require spontaneity, receptivity, and an attunement of “corporeal 
minds” that is played out through movement and subtle inter-species signals. They also impinge on 
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27 For an eye-opening, gait changing essay on Pistorius and disability see, Hilvoorde & Landenweerd “Disability or 
extraordinary talent.”
active pursuits because it is through these that we secure such experiences: for instance being able 
to freedive is paramount to engaging many marine animals in non-threatening ways because Scuba 
gear, while extending dive time considerably, is not suitable for all purposes: it compromises agility, 
and the bubbles and noise affects the animals’ behavioral patterns. Crease’s recent “Primate 
Physics,” a follow up to his article on athletes and physics, tantalizingly explores this facet. After 
looking at how physicists study primate movement, he relies on Sheets-Johnstone to discuss the 
physics intelligence animals need to choose from a repertoire of movements to effectively deal with 
the environment (2012b). There are also rich connections to be made with section 3.b above.
4. Conclusion
By way  of a concise conclusion, I would like to answer the question, what are the benefits of 
such an agenda for cognitive studies? There are theoretical, practical, and existential rewards to be 
reaped. The upshot is that exploring excellence and cognition under the aegis of movement 
originally  supplements cognitively  embodied approaches in ways that expand our understanding of 
how we think, learn, and feel. This ameliorative dynamic cognition, of kinesthetic-kinetic-tactile 
dimensions, motivates an expanded cognitive canon where broad cognition–blending theory and 
praxis–becomes the paradigm, extends the radius of research from laboratories and vision to other 
locales, scenarios, and senses in ways that deepen inquiry (and provide correctives), augments 
methodological possibilities, and enhances disciplinary collaboration, all of which supplements and 
enriches current research. Next I enumerate concrete cognitive and normative benefits first, and 
then existential ones. 
First, and cognitively, as argued above, active pursuits, and their cultivation and study as per 
the methodologies and disciplines outlined, are peremptory fields for a full understanding of the 
intersection and relation between the cognitive and normative. Second, this also expands our 
cognitive boundaries in terms of what is cognitively possible for us with regard to performance and 
discrimination of the experiences of said performances. Third, focusing on experts and exceptional 
performers further expands on the preceding point. Fourth, and in turn building on the previous 
point, inquiry into these practices from such varied fronts can result in improved or new techniques, 
standards, and performances that refine our skills and redefine what is possible to enact, experience, 
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and study.  Last, relations between researchers and practitioners, when both partake of each other’s 
way, are a crucial element which, when tied to broader methodology and interdisciplinary 
collaboration can truly  blossom into new agendas and areas of investigation (as the sketches 
suggest). 
This leads to existentially inspirational and transformative research that helps to better 
understand the process of cognition as a broad phenomenon that blends theory  and praxis, and is 
intimately  intertwined with normative values (ethical and esthetic) and how we best live our lives. 
Following Ortega y Gasset’s views, the celebratory spirit  rides on the shoulder of a wave 
(sometimes literally!) that eschews safe utilitarian cost-benefit calculations and embraces a sporting 
ethos modeled on the athlete, who exerts herself aware that all may come to naught (1961).28 
Indeed, a creative life and movement precisely grow out of such exploratory and risky—success is 
not assured—kinesthetic explorations. We may yet  be able to swim like the old man in Zhuangzi’s 
story. Active pursuits, particularly when cultivated to develop skillful fluency, are particularly fit 
modes to study and nurture a moving life and wisdom.
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